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C
ompanies spend millions of dollars on advertising to boost a brand’s image and simultaneously spend
millions of dollars on promotion that many believe calls attention to price and erodes brand equity. We
believe this paradoxical situation exists because both advertising and promotion are necessary to compete effec-
tively in dynamic markets. Consequently, brand managers need to account for interactions between marketing
activities and interactions among competing brands. By recognizing interaction effects between activities, man-
agers can consider interactivity trade-offs in planning the marketing-mix strategies. On the other hand, by
recognizing interactions with competitors, managers can incorporate strategic foresight in their planning, which
requires them to look forward and reason backward in making optimal decisions. Looking forward means that
each brand manager anticipates how other competing brands are likely to make future decisions, and then by
reasoning backward deduces one’s own optimal decisions in response to the best decisions to be made by all
other brands. The joint consideration of interaction effects and strategic foresight in planning marketing-mix
strategies is a challenging and unsolved marketing problem, which motivates this paper.
This paper investigates the problem of planning marketing mix in dynamic competitive markets. We extend
the Lanchester model by incorporating interaction effects, constructing the marketing-mix algorithm that yields
marketing-mix plans with strategic foresight, and developing the continuous-discrete estimation method to
calibrate dynamic models of oligopoly using market data. Both the marketing-mix algorithm and the estimation
method are general, so they can be applied to any other alternative model speciﬁcations for dynamic oligopoly
markets. Thus, this dual methodology augments the decision-making toolkit of managers, empowering them to
tackle realistic marketing problems in dynamic oligopoly markets.
We illustrate the application of this dual methodology by studying the dynamic Lanchester competition across
ﬁve brands in the detergents market, where each brand uses advertising and promotion to inﬂuence its own
market share and the shares of competing brands. Empirically, we ﬁnd that advertising and promotion not only
affect the brand shares (own and competitors’) but also exert interaction effects, i.e., each activity ampliﬁes or
attenuates the effectiveness of the other activity. Normatively, we ﬁnd that large brands underadvertise and
overspend on promotion, while small brands underadvertise and underpromote. Finally, comparative statics
reveal managerial insights into how a speciﬁc brand should respond optimally to the changes in a competing
brand’s situation; more generally, we ﬁnd evidence that competitive responsiveness is asymmetric.
Key words: continuous-discrete estimation; dynamic competition; interaction effects; marketing-mix planning;
strategic foresight; two-point boundary value problem
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1. Introduction
American corporations collectively spend over $500
billion on marketing activities; even individual com-
panies such as Procter and Gamble spend several bil-
lion dollars on advertising and promotion. Conse-
quently, the optimal allocation of marketing resources
to multiple activities—referred to as “planning the
marketing mix”—is of paramount importance (see
Mantrala 2002 for literature review). In the extant lit-
erature, dynamic planning models such as Naik et al.
(1998) and Silva-Risso et al. (1999) provide decision-
support tools to determine advertising schedules and
promotional calendars, respectively. These decision-
support models, however, ignore the game-theoretic
principle of strategic foresight, a notion that requires
the brand manager to look forward, i.e., anticipate how
other competing brands are likely to make future
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decisions, and then reason backward, i.e., deduce one’s
own optimal decisions in response to the best deci-
sions to be made by all other brands. On the other
hand, dynamic game-theoretic models that advo-
cate strategic foresight ignore the role of interactions
among multiple marketing activities. Such interac-
tions are central to the marketing-mix concept, which
“   emphasizes that marketing efforts create sales syn-
ergistically rather than independently” (see Gatignon
and Hanssens 1987, p. 247; Lilien et al. 1992, p. 5; also
see Gatignon 1993 for a literature review).
The joint consideration of both strategic foresight
and interaction effects in dynamic response models
represents an important gap in the marketing litera-
ture. For example, Fruchter and Kalish (1998, p. 22)
acknowledge
“   the limitations of current studies [not] to take into
account the interactions among the different instru-
ments. A challenge which we see for a future direction
is to develop a model which incorporates interactions
between promotional instruments.”
The challenging problems arise for the following
two reasons. First, as we show later, in the presence of
interaction effects, the optimal plans for all activities
are interdependent, thereby requiring managers to
account for the interactivity trade-offs in budget allo-
cations. In other words, the optimal level to spend on
advertising depends on the optimal level to spend on
promotion (and vice versa). Second, managers need
to know the joint effectiveness of marketing activi-
ties of all other brands to be able to determine their
own optimal marketing-mix plans. This demands a
new methodology for estimating dynamic models
of oligopoly markets using market data. Thus, both
the substantive problems—the determination of opti-
mal marketing-mix strategies and the estimation of
dynamic models for oligopoly markets—are unsolved
research topics because the necessary methodology
does not yet exist in marketing, economics, or man-
agement science (see Erickson 1991, Kamien and
Schwartz 1991, Dockner et al. 2000).
Given this gap in the literature, one cannot answer
basic questions of managerial interest: Do advertis-
ing and promotion amplify or attenuate their impact
on market outcomes (e.g., brand share) when used
together? How should managers allocate resources to
advertising and promotion in the presence of inter-
action effects? What is the level of optimal budget
and its allocation to promotional activities in the
presence of strategic foresight? Is own (or competi-
tor’s) brand underadvertising or overpromoting, or
both? If brand A’s interaction effect increases, should
brand B optimally respond by increasing advertising
or increasing promotion?
To help answer such questions, we develop two
methods: (i) a marketing-mix algorithm to plan opti-
mal marketing-mix strategies and (ii) an estimation
method to determine the effectiveness of marketing
activities and their interaction effects for each brand
in dynamic competitive markets.
The proposed marketing-mix algorithm solves the
multiple-player differential game resulting from the
dynamic models of oligopoly markets. Speciﬁcally,
it yields optimal marketing-mix strategies that are
(a) in equilibrium across multiple brands and over
time, (b) accounts for intertemporal trade-offs across
multiple periods (i.e., now versus later), and (c) bal-
ances interactivity trade-off among multiple market-
ing activities (e.g., advertising versus promotion).
Because this algorithm solves a general nonlinear
two-point boundary value problem, its applicability
extends to several differential game models in mar-
keting, not only the Lanchester model that we present
for the sake of exposition (see Remark 2 for details). In
addition, it furnishes both the open-loop and closed-
loop marketing-mix strategies (see the unabridged
manuscript, which is available from the authors upon
request).
The proposed estimation method calibrates a simul-
taneous system of coupled differential equations that
arise in the differential game competition in an
oligopoly. We note that standard time-series tech-
niques are applicable for discrete-time difference
equations (e.g., ARIMA-type models; see Blattberg
and Neslin 1990, Ch. 9) but not for continuous-
time models based on differential equations. Hence,
we develop an estimation approach for estimating
continuous-time models using discrete-time observed
data (e.g., weekly). Speciﬁcally, this approach pro-
vides maximum-likelihood estimates and standard
errors that incorporate (a) the temporal dependence
in brand shares, (b) their nonstationary dynamics, and
(c) the marketing-mix interactions and competitive
interdependencies.
To illustrate the application of these dual method-
ologies, we extend the Lanchester model in §2. Sec-
tion 3 analyzes the N-player differential game and
constructs the marketing-mix algorithm. Section 4
develops the continuous-discrete estimation approach
to estimate dynamic oligopoly models. We present an
illustrative example in §5 and conclude in §6.
2. Extended Lanchester Model
We extend the classical Lanchester model by intro-
ducing the following phenomena: multiple brands in
competition, multiple marketing activities that each
brand employs to inﬂuence its own and competing
brands’ shares, and interactions between marketing
activities.Naik, Raman, and Winer: Planning Marketing-Mix Strategies in the Presence of Interaction Effects
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Table 1 Related Literature
Multiple activities with Multiple activities
Single activity no interactions with interactions
Monopoly Sethi (1977) Naik and Raman (2003) Naik and Raman (2003)
Little (1979)
Duopoly Erickson (1991) Chintagunta and Vilcassim (1994) This study
Oligopoly Dockner et al. (2000) Fruchter and Kalish (1998) This study
2.1. Multiple Brands
In the classical Lanchester model, two brands com-
pete for market shares using advertising. Let mi t 
and ui t  denote market share and advertising effort,
respectively, for brand i, i = 1 and 2. Then, the
Lanchester model is
˙ m1 = 1u1 1−m1 − 2u2m1  (1)
where ˙ mi =dmi/dt is the rate of change in mi, and  i
denotes advertising effectiveness. In Equation (1), the
change in market share of the ﬁrst brand is due to two
sources. First, the ﬁrst brand captures some market
share from the other brand m2 =  1−m1  via its own
advertising (i.e., by increasing  1 or u1 . Second, it
loses market share when the other brand increases
advertising or improves effectiveness (i.e., as u2 or  2
increases).
Next, we extend this model to an oligopoly mar-
ket with N brands. For each brand i, i = 1     N,
let fi be the force of one’s own marketing activities;
for example, f1 = 1u1 and f2 = 2u2 in (1). Then, gen-
eralizing (1) to N brands, the market share of brand 1
evolves as follows:
dm1
dt
= f1 1−m1 −f2m1 −f3m1···
−fim1···−fNm1  (2)
We further simplify (2) to obtain ˙ m1 =f1−Fm1, where
F =
 N
i=1fi denotes the marketing force of all the
brands (including the ﬁrst brand). Thus, we formulate
the N-brand Lanchester model as the simultaneous
system of coupled differential equations:



˙ m1
     
˙ mN


=



f1
     
fN


−



F ··· 0
     
   
     
0 ··· F






m1
     
mN


  (3)
2.2. Multiple Marketing Activities with
Interaction Effects
Marketing activities such as advertising and promo-
tion generate the marketing force of a brand. Denot-
ing advertising and promotional efforts by  ui v i ,w e
specify the marketing force of brand i, i =1     N,
fi = iui + ivi + iuivi  (4)
where   i   i  represent the advertising and pro-
motion effectiveness, respectively, and  i is the
interaction effect. Equation (4) states that the market-
ing force depends not only on the weight of adver-
tising and promotion but also on their interaction;
both the weights and effectiveness are brand-speciﬁc.
Furthermore, each activity can amplify or attenuate
the effectiveness of other activities. Assuming posi-
tive effect of advertising, when brand i increases ui,
it not only increases its brand share mi (directly via
Equation (3)) but also inﬂuences the effectiveness of
the other activity vi because of the nonzero  i (indi-
rectly via Equation (4)). The two activities strengthen
the marketing force by creating synergy when  >0;
they weaken the marketing force when  <0. Finally,
we focus on two marketing activities because no new
conceptual issues arise in extending (4) to multiple
activities.
Remark 1. Table 1 shows how the extended
Lanchester model augments the marketing literature
on important dimensions. Speciﬁcally, Sethi (1977)
and Little (1979) review the literature on dynamic
monopoly models with single activity; Erickson (1991)
and Dockner et al. (2000) summarize dynamic com-
petitive models with a single activity. By introducing
multiple activities, Chintagunta and Vilcassim (1994)
and Fruchter and Kalish (1998) extend these differen-
tial game models but ignore interactions among these
activities. By introducing interaction effects, which
are central to the marketing-mix concept (see, e.g.,
Gatignon and Hanssens 1987; Gatignon 1993; Lilien
et al. 1992, p. 5), Naik and Raman (2003) establish
empirically the existence of synergy and offer theoret-
ical insights into budgeting and allocation decisions.
However, they investigate monopoly markets, which
ignore a competitor’s response to one’s own bud-
geting and allocation decisions. Hence, the extended
Lanchester model via (3) and (4) ﬁlls this gap in the
literature by incorporating both the interaction effects
and dynamic competition. Next, we analyze the dif-
ferential game for this extended model and construct
an algorithm that yields equilibrium marketing-mix
plans.
3. Marketing-Mix Algorithm
3.1. Differential Game Formulation
Each brand i develops its advertising plan ui t  and
promotion plan vi t  by maximizing its performanceNaik, Raman, and Winer: Planning Marketing-Mix Strategies in the Presence of Interaction Effects
28 Marketing Science 24(1), pp. 25–34, ©2005 INFORMS
index (Erickson 1991, p. 18):
J u i vi 
=
  T
t=0
e
− t
    
discounting
 
 pi t −vi t  
      
margin
mi t 
    
share
− c ui t  
      
advertising cost
 
      
net value
dt
      
discounted net value
  (5)
which quantiﬁes the performance of a strategy pair
 ui t  vi t  . In (5),   denotes the discount rate, pi is
the price of brand i,1 vi is the size of the deal, mi is the
market share, ui is the advertising effort, and c u  is
the cost of expending u. The associated Hamiltonian is
H
i ui v i = pi −vi mi −c ui + i fi −Fmi  
i =1     N  (6)
where  i t  is the co-state variable for brand i. Below
we assume the cost function c u  = bu + u2/2 (e.g.,
Fruchter and Kalish 1998), although the proposed
marketing-mix algorithm permits other functional
forms (see Remark 2 later).
3.2. Equilibrium Strategies
3.2.1. Optimal Advertising. By differentiating (6)
with respect to ui, and solving  Hi/ ui =0, we obtain
u
∗
i = i  i + ivi  1−mi −b  i=1     N  (7)
Equation (7) speciﬁes the optimal advertising strategy
for each brand i, which depends on one’s own mar-
ket share  mi , ad effectiveness   i , the cost param-
eter b, and other brands’ strategies via the co-state
variable  i t , whose dynamics we derive in Equa-
tion (12). It further reveals that, in the absence of inter-
action effects (i.e., when  i = 0), advertising plans do
not directly depend on the promotion plans. In con-
trast, in the presence of interaction effects (i.e., when
 i  = 0), optimal advertising u∗
i t  depends directly
on the promotion plan vi t . Hence, the interaction
effect qualitatively changes the planning of the marketing-
mix by requiring managers to account for interactivity
trade-offs.
3.2.2. Optimal Promotion. By differentiating (6)
with respect to vi, we obtain
 H
i/ vi =−mi + i 1−mi   i + iui   (8)
1 In practice, managers should use the net price   pi t =pi t −ci t 
to account for the unit cost of goods sold, ci. In developing the
marketing-mix algorithm, however, we assume it zero to minimize
notation without loss of generality. When using the algorithm,
managers can include the unit cost and perform the sensitivity
analysis (as we do in the empirical example).
which will not yield the optimal promotion plan v∗ t 
upon equating to zero. Hence, we deﬁne the switch-
ing function,
Di =−mi + i 1−mi   i + iui   (9)
which yields the optimal bang-bang policy,2
vi =
 
  vi Di >0
0 Di <0
 i =1     N  (10)
where   vi denotes the maximum deal amount for
brand i at time t. The promotion plan is either “on”
(i.e., offer price discount) or “off,” so we express it
by vi t =   viI Di > 0 , where I ·  denotes an indicator
variable 1 or 0 depending on whether the switch Di
is positive or not. This switch depends on the co-state
variable  i t , which involves the strategies of all com-
peting brands. Consequently, each brand forms an
expectation of whether other brands would promote
or not. By taking expectations, we ﬁnd that brand i’s
policy is given by
v
∗
i =   viE I Di >0  
=   vi Pr −mi + i 1−mi   i + iui >0 
=   vi Pr
 
mi <
 i  i + iui 
1+ i  i + iui 
 
=
  vi i  i + iui 
1+ i  i + iui 
  (11)
where the last equality follows by noting that the
support of brand share mi is the unit interval (0, 1),
which like the standard uniform variable U yields
Pr U <c =c. The ﬁxed point of (7) and (11) yields the
equilibrium pair (u∗ v∗) as a function of the co-state
variables   t .
3.2.3. Co-State Dynamics. We derive the co-state
dynamics by evaluating ˙  i =  i− Hi/ mi and obtain

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˙  N
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 1
     
 N

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−
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p1 −v1
     
pN −vN

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(12)
where ˙  i = d i/dt, and i = 1     N. The co-state
dynamics incorporate the fundamental principle of
2 We derive the limiting condition when the bang-bang policy could
degenerate to a singular value (i.e., constant discount). The con-
dition requires that every brand satisﬁes the equality:  1 − m1  ·
 p1 −v1   1 + 1u1 /m1 =···= 1−mi  pi −vi   i + iui /mi =···=
 1 − mN  pN − vN   N +  NuN /mN. If this equality holds in some
market, every brand would offer a ﬁxed discount, thus lowering its
regular price effectively, and the resulting marketing-mix problem
reduces to one of ﬁnding the optimal advertising plans, which is a
special case of the above problem.Naik, Raman, and Winer: Planning Marketing-Mix Strategies in the Presence of Interaction Effects
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strategic foresight, which requires managers to look
forward (i.e., forecast outcomes and anticipate com-
petitive moves) and reason backward (i.e., deduce
the best strategy via backward induction). Speciﬁ-
cally, to look forward, we apply the state dynamics
in (3) and (4); to anticipate competitive moves, we
evaluate the best strategies using (7) and (11); to rea-
son backward, we solve the co-state dynamics in (12)
from the terminal period to the initial time. Thus, we
can systematically create equilibrium marketing-mix
plans with strategic foresight by stacking the two sys-
tems of differential equations (3) and (12) and solving
them simultaneously together with (4), (7), and (11).
To solve the resulting two-point boundary value prob-
lem (TPBVP), we next construct a marketing-mix
algorithm.
3.3. Marketing-Mix Algorithm
We note that extant algorithms in marketing (e.g.,
Deal 1979, Thompson and Teng 1984, Erickson 1991)
are not applicable to solve the above TPBVP because
they ignore the coupling between and within the state
and the co-state equations. For example, the coupling
of differential equations arises because of the market
force F =fi+
 
fj in both (3) and (12). Hence, we con-
struct the following algorithm that not only accounts
for interequation coupling but also permits a general
nonlinear TPBVP speciﬁed by
˙ y =g y     (13)
where y and ˙ y are vectors with 2N elements (i.e., N
state and N co-state variables), and   denotes the
parameter space. Speciﬁcally, the algorithm consists
of the four steps:
Step 1. Boundary conditions. Choose M grid points
on a timeline, k =1 2     M, and specify two points
for the boundary conditions: the initial k =0, and the
terminal k =M +1.
Step 2. Finite difference equations. Create difference
equations Ek ≡ yk − yk−1 − hg wk   , where h =
tk − tk−1, and wk =  yk + yk−1 /2. Then stack all the
equations E1 E 2     E M+1 one below the other, and
denote this stack by the vector-valued function G x ,
where x =vec y1 y 2     y M .
Step 3. Nonlinear root-ﬁnding. Solve the equations
G x =0 via Newton-Rahpson method.
Step 4. Optimal marketing-mix plans. Using state and
co-state trajectories obtained from step 3, determine
the marketing-mix plans via (7) through (10), and
evaluate their performance via (5).
For further details, see Table 3 in the unabridged
manuscript (available from the authors).
Remark 2. This algorithm is not restricted to the
extended Lanchester model; it encompasses other
alternative model speciﬁcations for dynamic oligo-
poly markets. Its generality stems from the mathe-
matical structure of a TPBVP, which subsumes several
differential games in marketing because all of them
are expressible in the form of Equation (13). After
expressing a game as Equation (13), the above algo-
rithm yields the optimal strategies—only the shape
of the link function g ·  and the set of input argu-
ments  y    change to accommodate different speciﬁ-
cations and phenomena. Speciﬁcally, it accommodates
different state dynamics instead of (3); different mar-
keting forces instead of (4); different marketing objec-
tives instead of (5); and different phenomena such
as channel members, reference prices, or cost func-
tions. Furthermore, it is not restricted to open-loop
marketing-mix plans; it also furnishes closed-loop
marketing-mix strategies (see §5.3 in the unabridged
manuscript). Next, we develop an approach to quan-
tify the effectiveness and interaction effects for each
brand in the oligopoly and to infer their statistical sig-
niﬁcance based on market data.
4. Continuous-Discrete Estimation
Method
We note that the brand-share dynamics in (3) are in
continuous time; that is, the time parameter t in the
model is continuously differentiable on any interval
 t  ¯ t . In contrast, brand-share data arrive at discrete
points in time (e.g., weeks). In other words, the time
parameter t in the data series is not continuously
differentiable; rather it takes discrete values in the
integer set  1 2 3     T . To resolve this mismatch,
we develop an approach to estimate continuous-time
models using discrete-time data.
Let mk denote the N × 1 vector of brand shares
at time tk, where k is an integer in the index set
 1 2     T . Using (3), we integrate over the inter-
val (tk−1 t k] to obtain the exact equation relating the
brand shares at two discrete time points:
mk −mk−1 =
  tk
tk−1
dm=
  tk
tk−1
 
dm
dt
 
dt =
  tk
tk−1
  ˙ m dt 
which, upon simpliﬁcation, yields the matrix transi-
tion equation
mk = kmk−1 + k  (14)
where  k = exp Ak  is a N × N transition matrix,
exp ·  is the matrix exponentiation function, Ak is a
diagonal N × N matrix with  −Fk  as the elements
on the principal diagonal, and the N × 1 drift vector
 k = exp Ak −IN A−1
k fk,whereIN isanN-dimensional
identity matrix, and fk =  f1k     f Nk   is the vector of
marketing forces for the N brands.
Let yik denote the observed share for brand i at
time tk. Because brand shares sum to 100%, once we
know  N −1  brand shares, the realized share for the
remaining brand, yNk, provides no new information,
because it must equal 100 −
 N−1
i=1 yik. Consequently,Naik, Raman, and Winer: Planning Marketing-Mix Strategies in the Presence of Interaction Effects
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we need information on any  N − 1  brands, which
we link to (14) via the observation equation



y1k
     
yN−1 k


=

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

100 ··· 0
     
   
     
0 ··· 100







m1k
     
mN−1 k


  (15)
where Yk =  y1k     y N−1 k   are the observed brand
shares (in percentages).
We express (14) and (15), together, in the state-space
form (Shumway and Stoffer 2000):
Yk =zm k + k 
mk = kmk−1 + k + k 
(16)
where z is a diagonal matrix with its principal ele-
ments equal to 100, and the error-terms follow the
normal distributions,  k ∼ N 0 H  and  k ∼ N 0 Q ,
where H is the diagonal matrix  2IN−1 and Q is the
diagonal matrix, diag  2
1      2
N−1 . We then compute
the likelihood function for observing the trajectory of
market shares of all the brands in an oligopoly by
L   Y  = h Y1 Y 2     Y T 
= h Y1 ×h Y2  Y1 ×h Y3   Y1 Y 2  
×···×h YT   Y1 Y 2     Y T−1  
=
T  
k=1
h Yk  k−1   (17)
where h Y1     Y T denotes the joint density func-
tion, h Yk   k−1  represents the conditional density
function, whose moments are obtained from the
Kalman ﬁlter recursions, and the information set
k = Y1 Y 2     Y k  contains the market history up to
time tk. By maximizing (17), we obtain the maximum-
likelihood estimates
    =ArgMax
 ∈ 
Ln L   Y    (18)
For statistical inference, we obtain the standard errors
by taking the square-root of the diagonal elements of
the covariance matrix:
Var     =
 
−
 2Ln L   Y  
     
 −1
 =   
  (19)
Remark 3. The estimation of continuous-time
models (e.g., Equation (3)) via the ordinary least-
squares (OLS) regression results in biased estimates
for the following three reasons. First, the OLS regres-
sion requires independence between brand shares at
two points in time, Yk and Yk . Clearly, such temporal
independence cannot exist because the differential
equation (3) explicitly induces dependence over
time. Second, this temporal dependence does not
vanish or diminish because brand-share dynamics
are nonstationary, a fact evident from the transition
matrix  k in (14), which is time-varying because it
depends on k. Finally, the shares of all N brands
in an oligopoly are highly interdependent on each
other’s marketing activities. Speciﬁcally, we observe
from (14) that both  k and  k depend nonlinearly
on the marketing forces F and fi. Therefore, in the
proposed method, we explicitly account for temporal
dependence, nonstationary dynamics, promotional
mix interactions, and competitive interdependencies
in estimating dynamic oligopoly models. We next
illustrate its application to the dynamic oligopoly of
detergents brands.
5. Empirical Application
5.1. Data
We use single-source data for the ﬁve detergents
brands Tide, Wisk, Era, Solo, and Bold, whose aver-
age percentage shares are 43, 19, 16, 13, and 9, respec-
tively. The data consist of the purchase histories,
prices paid, cents-off deal, and TV viewing by house-
holds over 84 weeks (see Winer 1993 for details).
Because the Lanchester model is speciﬁed at the
brand level, researchers usually use market- or store-
level data for calibration (e.g., Little 1979, Chintagunta
and Vilcassim 1994). While aggregate market data
furnish information on competing brands for many
nongrocery products, the household-level data pro-
vide opportunities not available in aggregate data.
For example, we can identify the advertisements seen
by each household, the deal it received, and the
brands it bought subsequently. Using this detailed
information, we can operationalize better measures of
advertising and promotion. For example, to measure
advertising, we use opportunity-to-see (OTS), which
is deﬁned as the number of exposures viewed by a
household within a purchase cycle (Lilien et al. 1992,
pp. 272–274). For further details, see the unabridged
version.
5.2. Empirical Results
5.2.1. Model Selection, Cross-Validation, and
Hausman Test. We apply the proposed continuous-
discrete estimation method to estimate several alter-
native model speciﬁcations: dynamic model with
interactions, dynamic model without interactions,
price effects with interactions, price effects with-
out interactions, diminishing returns (square-root),
increasing returns (quadratic). Based on information
criteria (not presented here for brevity), we retain
the extended Lanchester model in (3) and (4)—
it is not only parsimonious but also ﬁts the data
well for all ﬁve brands. In addition, to assess pre-
dictive validity, we conduct cross-validation usingNaik, Raman, and Winer: Planning Marketing-Mix Strategies in the Presence of Interaction Effects
Marketing Science 24(1), pp. 25–34, ©2005 INFORMS 31
Table 2 Continuous-Discrete Kalman Filter Estimates
Parameters Tide Wisk Era Solo Bold
Ad effectiveness,  i 0 350  33 0 130  10 0 35
 0 07   0 11   0 04   0 03   0 26 
Promotion effectiveness,  i 0 380  14 0 18 0 18 0 22
 0 09   0 04   0 05   0 04   0 12 
Ad-promotion interaction,  i −0 33 −0 130  02 −0 08 −0 35
 −0 08   −0 22   0 06   −0 06   −0 62 
Transition noise, exp bi  bi −4 70 −5 21 −5 41 −6 30—
 −0 19   −0 24   −0 28   −0 38 
Observation noise,   2 96
 1 07 
Maximized log-likelihood, LL∗ −852 55
72 observations for calibration and 12 observations for
out-of-sample validation, and we ﬁnd high R2 for out-
of-sample forecasts across all ﬁve brands. Finally, we
apply the Hausman test, ﬁnd m = 10 23 and critical
 2
20 0 95 =31 41, and thus cannot reject the null hypoth-
esis of exogeneity of advertising and promotion. We
present the parameter estimates and standard errors
(in parentheses) in Table 2.
5.2.2. Advertising and Promotion Effectiveness.
Table 2 indicates that ad and promotion effectiveness
vary considerably in this detergents market. Specif-
ically, ad effectiveness of all brands, except Bold,
is signiﬁcant (p-values < 0 05). Tide’s advertising is
the most effective, whereas Solo’s advertising is the
least effective. Similarly, promotion effectiveness of all
brands, except Bold, is signiﬁcant (p-values < 0 05).
Tide’s promotion is the most effective, while Wisk’s
promotion is the least effective.
5.2.3. Interaction Effects. Table 2 also shows that
all brands, except Era, exhibit negative interactions
between advertising and promotion. For assessing
joint signiﬁcance, we test the null H0   1 =  2 =  3 =
 4 = 5 =0 by using the likelihood ratio (LR) test. The
LR statistic is 20.6, which exceeds the critical value
 2
5 =11 1( p-value=0 00096). Hence, we reject the null
hypothesis of no interaction effects. In addition, multi-
ple information criteria (not reported here for brevity)
reinforce the ﬁnding that interaction effects exist in
this detergents market. Thus, when advertising and
Table 3 Actual Versus Optimal Advertisingand Promotion
Advertising Promotion
(weekly opportunity-to-see in minutes) (average deal in cents)
Brands Actual Optimal Actual Optimal
Tide 18 02 5  6 Underadvertise 62 0 Overpromote
Wisk 6 22 4  9 Underadvertise 44 0 Overpromote
Era 9 92 0  6 Underadvertise 37 47 Underpromote
Solo 8 82 0  6 Underadvertise 39 47 Underpromote
Bold 3 318  6 Underadvertise 232 Overpromote
promotion are used together, their impact on brand
shares is attenuated.
One interpretation of negative interaction, as in
Mela et al. (1997) and Jedidi et al. (1999), is that “pro-
motions are bad”—but not because they directly hurt
brand shares. Indeed, the direct effect of promotion
is positive, making it an effective marketing activity.
Rather, promotion negatively moderates the impact
of advertising, thereby reducing the effectiveness of
advertising in building brands. Another interpretation
of this negative interaction is that advertising lowers
consumer sensitivity to promotion activities.
5.2.4. Optimal Advertising and Promotion. We
apply the proposed marketing-mix algorithm to ﬁnd
optimal advertising and promotion and present the
results in Table 3. We observe that all brands under-
advertise (i.e., actual advertising is below the optimal
level). In contrast, some brands overpromote whereas
others underpromote. These ﬁndings are not sensitive
to marginal changes in unit cost (not reported here
for space constraints). Speciﬁcally, Tide and Wisk,
who underadvertise, tend to promote excessively. It
appears that large brands allocate fewer resources to
advertising relative to promotion, a ﬁnding consis-
tent with the notion of escalation of promotion due
to managers’ lack of strategic foresight (Leeﬂang and
Wittink 2001, p. 120). On the other hand, some small
brands (e.g., Era) both underadvertise and underpro-
mote, perhaps due to lack of resources.Naik, Raman, and Winer: Planning Marketing-Mix Strategies in the Presence of Interaction Effects
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5.2.5. Optimal Competitive Responsiveness.
Managers can gain further insights via comparative
statics analyses. For example, if Tide’s interaction
effect increases, would Wisk respond with increased
advertising or should it increase promotion? Would
Solo’s response differ from Tide’s? Managers can
answer these strategic questions by ﬁrst applying the
proposed marketing-mix algorithm to characterize
the optimal advertising and promotion strategies for
own and competitors brands, and then changing the
parameter of interest (say, Tide’s interaction effect),
while keeping other parameters constant, to ﬁnd the
new optimal strategies.
Table 4 displays the comparative statics results
with respect to interaction effects  i for each brand
 i = 1     5 . Speciﬁcally, it reveals that the optimal
competitive response is not symmetric. For example,
based on the second column in Table 4, when Tide’s
negative interaction increases, it decreases advertis-
ing and increases promotion; all other brands’ fol-
low Tide’s actions. By contrast, based on the third
column in Table 4, when Wisk’s negative interaction
increases, it increases advertising and decreases promo-
tion (unlike Tide’s actions in column 2); other brands’
follow suit, but not Tide whose best response is to
decrease advertising and increase promotion. While
this ﬁnding of asymmetry is new, the main point of
this illustration is the ability afforded by the proposed
marketing-mix algorithm for managers to gain such
insights into their product markets. Thus, in practice,
managers can also learn competitive responsiveness
with respect to other parameters (e.g., what if ad or
promotion effectiveness changes?).
Remark 4. We close by noting a useful property
of this marketing-mix algorithm. Consider a typical
brand manager who decides whether to promote or
not in each week of the annual horizon. This brand
manager then encounters 2×2×2×···52 times=252
possibilities, which represents thousands of trillions of
promotion plans. Brand managers cannot enumerate
trillions of plans to select the best one, even with
the availability of modern computers. Consequently,
the determination of the “best” promotion schedule
is practically impossible. Hence, it is remarkable that
the proposed marketing-mix algorithm ﬁnds the opti-
mal plan in a few minutes via the powerful concept
Table 4 Change in Relative Allocation Between Advertising and
Promotion Due to Marginal Change in Own Interaction Effect
Brands Tide     ↑ Wisk     ↑ Era     ↑ Solo     ↑ Bold     ↑
Tide’s response Decrease Decrease Increase Decrease Decrease
Wisk’s response Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Increase
Era’s response Decrease Increase Increase Increase Increase
Solo’s response Decrease Increase Decrease Decrease Increase
Bold’s response Decrease Increase Decrease Increase Increase
of “switching functions” (see Equation (9) and the
unabridged manuscript for details).
6. Discussion
We acknowledge limitations of the model and identify
avenues for future research.
6.1. Alternative Speciﬁcations
Wittink et al. (1988, p. 4) make the point forcefully
that, although managers have strong interest in mar-
ket share, category sales may ﬂuctuate over time.
Market share models, such as the Lanchester model,
ignore the ﬂuctuations in category sales. To capture
this feature, let M t denote category volume at time t
so that Equation (3) becomes ˙ Si =M t fi t −F t S i t ,
where Si t  is the sales of brand i  i=1     N . Then,
the ﬁrst-order conditions for the resulting sales game
are structurally equivalent to Equations (7) and (9).
Consequently, we can apply the proposed marketing-
mix algorithm to obtain the optimal strategies in the
presence of ﬂuctuating category sales (see Remark 2).
Thus, managers can investigate how over- or under-
spending changes across various patterns of category
sales (e.g., seasonality).
Another limitation of the Lanchester model is that
it misses lead and lag effects for advertising and
promotion. Recently, van Heerde et al. (2000) stud-
ied the role of lead and lag effects of promotion and
detected pre- and postpromotion dips in store-level
data. To incorporate this feature in the Lanchester
model, let ui
t+ ∗ and vi
t+ ∗ denote the lead variables
and ui
t−  and vi
t−  be the lagged variables for adver-
tising and promotion, respectively. Then, by extend-
ing (4), we obtain the marketing force fi =  iui +
 ivi +  iuivi +
 K∗
 ∗=1 i  ∗ui t+ ∗ +
 K
 =1 i  ui t− , for
each brand i =1     N, where K∗ and K denote the
number of lead and lagged variables in the model.
Note that these new regressors in the extended spec-
iﬁcation naturally (i.e., without any modiﬁcations)
enter into the transition matrix  k and the drift
vector  k via Fk and fk in Equation (14). Conse-
quently, managers can apply the proposed estima-
tion method (see §4) to estimate the lead effects
     i 1     i 2         i K∗  as well as the lagged effects
     i 1     i 2         i K . To determine the optimal values
of K∗ and K, classical information criteria (e.g., AIC,
BIC) can be applied for parametric model speciﬁca-
tions. When model speciﬁcation is semiparametric or
nonparametric (for example, local polynomial regres-
sion; see van Heerde et al. 2004), then the corrected
criterion AICC (Naik and Tsai 2001) or RIC (Naik and
Tsai 2003) needs to be applied. Thus, managers can
investigate the number and nature of lead and lagged
effects of both advertising and promotion in dynamic
competitive markets.Naik, Raman, and Winer: Planning Marketing-Mix Strategies in the Presence of Interaction Effects
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Finally, our model speciﬁcation misses the sup-
port variables such as features and displays,
which are shown to interact with price discounts
(see van Heerde et al. 2004). While we focused
on advertising-promotion interactions in order to
develop general methods for estimating dynamic
game-theoretic models and computing optimal strate-
gies, we note that no new methodological issues arise
in applying the dual methodology to study other
interaction effects. Indeed, different model speciﬁca-
tions would inﬂuence empirical results and yield new
marketing insights. Hence, to enrich our understand-
ing of marketing, future researchers should investi-
gate the impact of interaction effects of support activ-
ities on optimal budgeting and allocation.
6.2. Dynamic Endogeneity
We conducted the Hausman (1978) test and rejected
endogeneity of advertising and promotion. Further-
more, we applied the notions in Engle et al. (1983)
and reached the same conclusions (see the unabridged
version). Both the approaches reinforce each other
to enhance conﬁdence and convergent validity. How-
ever, parameter estimates could still be biased due to
the possibility of serial correlation causing dynamic
endogeneity in advertising and promotion. Thus,
future researchers need to develop statistical tests
for detecting dynamic endogeneity, characterize the
proﬁt impact of such biased estimates, and recom-
mend approaches for de-biasing (see Naik and Tsai
2000 for such efforts in dynamic errors-in-variable
problem).
6.3. Role of Retailers
We formulated and examined an extended Lanchester
game that describes dynamic competition among
multiple manufacturers who incorporate strategic
foresight in making intertemporal decisions for mul-
tiple marketing activities in the presence of interac-
tions. Our analysis ignores the role of retailers. On
the other hand, Moorthy (2005) and Besanko et al.
(2005) investigate retailers’ pass-through behavior but
ignore the effects of intertemporal dynamics, multiple
marketing activities, and interaction effects. Future
researchers could combine these strands of research
by analyzing dynamic competition among manu-
facturers over time, among retailers, and among
manufacturer-retailer dyads. This problem is not only
challenging but also an important unsolved problem
in marketing science.
7. Concluding Remarks
In dynamic competitive markets, managers should
recognize the presence of interactions within mar-
keting activities and between competing brands. To
this end, they should incorporate strategic foresight
in their planning by looking forward and reasoning
backward in making optimal decisions. By looking
forward, each brand manager forecasts his own future
plans and anticipates the decisions to be made by
other competing brands; by reasoning backward, they
deduce their own optimal decisions in response to the
best strategies of all other brands. To incorporate the
interaction effects and strategic foresight in dynamic
oligopoly models, this paper contributes to the mar-
keting literature by creating two methods: marketing-
mix algorithm and continuous-discrete estimation
method. These dual methodologies enable the com-
putation of optimal marketing-mix plans and the esti-
mation of dynamic game-theoretic models.
We apply the dual methodologies to (a) deter-
mine the optimal budget and allocation decisions, and
(b) estimate the effectiveness of advertising and pro-
motion and their interaction effect for each of the ﬁve
brands in a detergents market. We caution the readers
that our empirical conclusions about over- and under-
spending can change under different, more realistic
model speciﬁcations. Hence, managers should ﬁrst ﬁt
several alternative speciﬁcations using the proposed
estimation method (see §6.1) and then determine
the speciﬁcation to retain using appropriate infor-
mation criteria (Naik and Tsai 2001, 2004). Finally,
when managers apply the marketing-mix algorithm
to their speciﬁc markets, they may discover opti-
mal marketing-mix plans that could appear different
from the “business-as-usual” norm. In such situations,
managers should use the resulting insights to conduct
a small-scale experiment in real markets to generate
further market-based evidence and to gain support
from other constituencies, both internal (e.g., sales
force) and external (e.g., channel members), for suc-
cessful implementation of marketing-mix strategies.
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